This Shabbos is the second day of Shavuos. In Israel, however, it is Shabbos parshas Naso. We will not “catch up” to them until we read Chukkas-Balak. Why do we wait until Chukas Balak and not lain Naso-Behaaloscha together (other than we at the lainers union would strike for a parsha over 325 psukim long)? And, what is a ben chutz-laaretz to do if he’s in Israel for shuvuos?
We read the entire Torah every year, between Breishis and Simchas Torah, with the reading we read every Shabbos morning. See Rambam Hil. Tefilla 13:1; the fact that we read on Shabbos morning is in Halacha 3 there. There used to be a minhag to finish the Torah in 3 years, but we are not allowed to do that anymore. (Why the cycle begins on and ends based on Simchas Torah – see R. Zevin, Moadim B'Halacha, Simchas Torah. Seems to be from gemara in Megilla 31 that the reading of that day is Zos Habracha, but it is different than the other readings mentioned there - those are deviations from the order, this one is part of the order of what we read every Shabbos.)
Megilla 31b: R. Shimon ben Elazar said, Ezra decreed for Yisrael to read the curses in Vayikra (i.e., Bechukosai) before Shavuos and the curses in Devarim (i.e., Ki Tavo) before Rosh Hashana. Rambam adds quite a bit in Hil. Tefilla (13:2):
עזרא תיקן להן לישראל, שיהיו קורין קללות שבספר ויקרא, קודם עצרת; ושבמשנה תורה, קודם ראש השנה. והמנהג הפשוט, שיהו קוראין "במדבר סיני" קודם עצרת; "ואתחנן" אחר תשעה באב; ו"אתם ניצבים" קודם ראש השנה; ו"צו את אהרון" קודם הפסח בשנה פשוטה. לפיכך יש שבתות שקורין בשחרית, שני סדרין כגון "אישה כי תזריע" ו"זאת תהיה" ו"בהר סיני" ו"אם בחוקותי" וכיוצא בהן--כדי שישלימו בשנה, ויקראו אותן הסדרים בעונתן.
His main addition is that the minhag is to read certain parshios before holidays. (The Rav gave reasons for these; the only one I heard (from R. Chaim Ilson) is that Tzav is before Pesach because Tzav discusses koshering keilim that had hetera bala, and chametz before Pesach is heteira bala. I looked and looked and found this buried in Harerei Kedem.)
The Meiri in Kiryat Sefer, Maamar 5 chelek 1 gives a very good summary of the order of laining. Basically, there are more parshios than non-Yom Tov Shabbos days in the year, so to finish the Torah in a year, we must read some parshios together. He lists which ones may be read together. It seems to be fully based on minhag.
But what is clear from the Meiri, and seems to follow from the Rambam, is that we read two parshios together right before a “deadline parsha,” that is, a parsha which must be read before a given holiday. Tzav is read before Pesach in a non-leap year. It must be Tzav alone, not with Vayikra. And it does not logically make sense to read Pekudei and Vayikra together for two reasons: one is there is no such minhag, and two, there is a huge space in a sefer Torah between sefaim, so it does not make sense to read one parsha from sefer Shemos and one from Sefer Vayikra together. So we read Vayakhel Pikudei together. Why not Ki Sisa with Tetzaveh? The Meiri says Ki Sisa and Vayifen (about the Eigel) were two separate parshios which were kind of merged as one, so that’s considered a double parsha, and we read Terumah Tetzaveh before Ki Tisa, which allows us to reach Tzav the week before Pesach. We see that we only read double parshios as late as possible before the holiday. We don’t read Breishis & Noach together, and Lech Lecha and Vayeira together and then read all single parshios until Pesach.
So for Shavuos, we read Bamidbar before Shavuos. The next Shabbos we have to reach a certain Parsha for a certain holiday is Vaeschanan after Tisha B’av (as Rambam says). Again with a calculation similar to the one made for the parshios before Pesach, and with a further requirement (I don’t know why, but this is the minhag) we read the 3 haftoras of Destruction before Tisha B’av on Devarim and the two preceeding shabbasos – either Pinchas and Matos-Masei, or Matos and Masei alone, depending on which day of the week the fast of 17 Tammuz falls. So the last Shabbos before Pinchas is…a need to read Chukkas and Balak together. And with the regular rules of reading double Parshios, we read them as late as possible, and not Naso-Behhaloscha together, and in Chutz Laaretz we do not care that we are a week behind Israel’s parshios.
Sunday, May 24, 2009
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
78a - Tipa Ksheira
78a - Rabi Yehuda wants to make a gzeira shava that just as the daughter of a chalal, who was born from "tipa ksheira" (kosher seed) may not marry a kohen, the daughter of a ger, who was not born from tipa ksheira, is certainly not allowed to marry a kohen. (I've discussed this in 2 posts: here & here.)
Sanhedrin 36b says we need 2 psukim to include certain people as eligible to be judges: one to include mamzerim, and one to include geirim, the pasuk is needed because we'd think ger cannot be a judge because he is not from "tipa ksheira," a kosher drop, so the pasuk allows him to be a judge. Ritva, Kiddushin 14a s.v. veha d'amrinan brings this gemara with a different girsa - "tipa serucha," probably translated as putrid drop (see Avos 3:1, Akavia ben Mehallel says look at three things and you will not come to sin...from whence you came - mitipa serucha." There is definitely referring to tipa of a yisrael, but it's trying to tell us from a little, disgusting thing, and is not trying to tell us that the tipa is ad, like the Ritva means.) (Ritva is discussing what I discussed in this post.)
Rambam Isurei Biah 12:13 - to have a child with a shifcha (female slave) is very bad because "the son of a shifcha is a slave and is not Yisrael, and you cause the "zera kodesh" to be profaned and to be slaves..."
Ramban, Igeres Hakodesh Chapter 2 discusses how holy the connection between a husband and wife is - if it's leshaim shamayim. At the end of that chapter he writes "if a man does not intend lesheim shamayim, that zera that comes from him is tipa serucha, and Hashem Yisbarach has no portion in it (as opposed to when it is lesheim shamyaim, there are three partners in the child - the father, te mother and Hashem, as Ramban discussed earlier in that perek), and he is called one who "destroyed his way on the earth;" his body will be destroyed and he will plant an asheira (tree served as idolatry) and will fatten calves for idolatry due to the fact that he emitted zera mekulkal (debased seed)."
So we see how some rishonim use the term tipa ksheira or zera kodesh or tipa mekulakl, etc.
Sanhedrin 36b says we need 2 psukim to include certain people as eligible to be judges: one to include mamzerim, and one to include geirim, the pasuk is needed because we'd think ger cannot be a judge because he is not from "tipa ksheira," a kosher drop, so the pasuk allows him to be a judge. Ritva, Kiddushin 14a s.v. veha d'amrinan brings this gemara with a different girsa - "tipa serucha," probably translated as putrid drop (see Avos 3:1, Akavia ben Mehallel says look at three things and you will not come to sin...from whence you came - mitipa serucha." There is definitely referring to tipa of a yisrael, but it's trying to tell us from a little, disgusting thing, and is not trying to tell us that the tipa is ad, like the Ritva means.) (Ritva is discussing what I discussed in this post.)
Rambam Isurei Biah 12:13 - to have a child with a shifcha (female slave) is very bad because "the son of a shifcha is a slave and is not Yisrael, and you cause the "zera kodesh" to be profaned and to be slaves..."
Ramban, Igeres Hakodesh Chapter 2 discusses how holy the connection between a husband and wife is - if it's leshaim shamayim. At the end of that chapter he writes "if a man does not intend lesheim shamayim, that zera that comes from him is tipa serucha, and Hashem Yisbarach has no portion in it (as opposed to when it is lesheim shamyaim, there are three partners in the child - the father, te mother and Hashem, as Ramban discussed earlier in that perek), and he is called one who "destroyed his way on the earth;" his body will be destroyed and he will plant an asheira (tree served as idolatry) and will fatten calves for idolatry due to the fact that he emitted zera mekulkal (debased seed)."
So we see how some rishonim use the term tipa ksheira or zera kodesh or tipa mekulakl, etc.
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Pilegesh, Part 5
Common Law Marriage Requiring a Get
Lemaissa, what is the status a common-law marriage, one where a couple is living together in an exclusive relationship, or are even civilly married, but are not formally married with chuppa v'kiddushin -- are they considered married? R' Yosef Eliyahu Henkin (Peirushei Ivra 4 &5) says that such a couple are halachikly married and if their relationship ends, the man would need to give a get to the woman. R' Moshe Feinstein agrees that the woman should not remarry without a get. See Igros Moshe E"H I 74 where he quotes R' Henkin's opinion but rejects it, and see Igros Moshe E"H III 23 (and R' Moshe discusses it other places as well; he says R' Henkin would agree no get is needed if there was a Reform wedding, see E"H III 23). I'm mentioning this not regarding the permissibility of such a situation, rather if a dissolution would require a get. (This machlokes is very important in certain mamzeirus shailos, where a mother was previously married in a common-law marriage.) Because of the severity of the prohibition of eishes ish, the couple in such a situation should have a get even according to R' Moshe. However, absent a get, we will not consider the children of a woman who remarried after a common-law marriage to be mamzerim, in accordance with R' Moshe's psak. Note: see R' Moshe's teshuvos for the exact situations. Some of his statements may not be applicable to certain cases and certainly should not be understood that his teshuvos, or my bringing them here, as blanket statements.
Summary
To the Rambam there is no pilegesh to a non-melech. The Ramban permits it theoretically, but practically even the Ramban holds you couldn't have a pilegesh because she is not allowed to go to the mikva for her tumas nida since she is not married (as brought in the Rivash 425). Many bring Teshuvos HaRan 68 as allowing pilegesh. However, that case is a) already bidieved; we're not pasuling her more, we're only saying she was pilegesh and not an adulteress, and b) the main thrust of that question was does she need to wait 93 days to remarry or not. The question wasn't asking if she's allowed to be his pilegesh in the first place.
Lemaissa, what is the status a common-law marriage, one where a couple is living together in an exclusive relationship, or are even civilly married, but are not formally married with chuppa v'kiddushin -- are they considered married? R' Yosef Eliyahu Henkin (Peirushei Ivra 4 &5) says that such a couple are halachikly married and if their relationship ends, the man would need to give a get to the woman. R' Moshe Feinstein agrees that the woman should not remarry without a get. See Igros Moshe E"H I 74 where he quotes R' Henkin's opinion but rejects it, and see Igros Moshe E"H III 23 (and R' Moshe discusses it other places as well; he says R' Henkin would agree no get is needed if there was a Reform wedding, see E"H III 23). I'm mentioning this not regarding the permissibility of such a situation, rather if a dissolution would require a get. (This machlokes is very important in certain mamzeirus shailos, where a mother was previously married in a common-law marriage.) Because of the severity of the prohibition of eishes ish, the couple in such a situation should have a get even according to R' Moshe. However, absent a get, we will not consider the children of a woman who remarried after a common-law marriage to be mamzerim, in accordance with R' Moshe's psak. Note: see R' Moshe's teshuvos for the exact situations. Some of his statements may not be applicable to certain cases and certainly should not be understood that his teshuvos, or my bringing them here, as blanket statements.
Summary
To the Rambam there is no pilegesh to a non-melech. The Ramban permits it theoretically, but practically even the Ramban holds you couldn't have a pilegesh because she is not allowed to go to the mikva for her tumas nida since she is not married (as brought in the Rivash 425). Many bring Teshuvos HaRan 68 as allowing pilegesh. However, that case is a) already bidieved; we're not pasuling her more, we're only saying she was pilegesh and not an adulteress, and b) the main thrust of that question was does she need to wait 93 days to remarry or not. The question wasn't asking if she's allowed to be his pilegesh in the first place.
Friday, May 15, 2009
Pilegesh, Part 4
Pre-marital relations
In the text of the birkas eirusin (see Kesubos 7) we say "v'asar lanu es ha'arusos," that conjugal relations are forbidden between a man and his betrothed (i.e., the ring was given but they didn't have chupah & sheva brachos yet. That stage is called both kiddushin and nesuin; I'll use those terms interchangably). Nearly all rishonim explain this to mean it's prohibited midirabnan. (See Rambam that even one who was mekadesh with biah is asur lavo aleha again before chuppa.) However, the Shita Mikubetzes (Kesubos 7b s.v. vz"l haRashba) brings the Raavad (personally, I'm not sure if this is the same Raavad as the Hasagos Haraavad, based on his comment at the beginning of hilchos Ishus) that when we say "v'asar lanu es ha'arusos," it means she is forbidden midioraissa. How can this be explained? My Rebbi Rav Ahron zt"l explained that first of all, the Raavad held like Rabbeinu Nissim Gaon in Tosfos Kiddushin 10a s.v. Kol that "ki yikach ish isha" is referring to nisuin, not eirusin. And second of all, the Raavad agrees with the Rambam (SHM Lo Sasaseh 355) that it is asur midioraissa to have conjugal relations with a woman without chuppa v'kiddushin, and basically the Raavad holds it's an issur aseh (the positive commandment not to have relations makes it prohibited, but lav haba miclal asei, asei - see Rambam SHM Shoresh 6). Thus conjugal relations before chuppa has taken place, even between a betrothed couple, is assur midioraissa according to the Raavad. Ramban, in a teshuva (284) says "v'asar lanu es haarusos" tells us it's only prohibited for a marriage without bracha. But without a marriage, you don't need a bracha. (Does this lead logically to R' Henkin's position [stay tuned for that]?)
Once we're on the topic of birchas erusin, why is the text of the bracha "mekadesh es amo yisrael al yidei chuppa v'kiddushin," if kiddushin (eirusin) takes place before the chuppa? (Note: the Mishna Lamelech says that the Rambam holds chuppa may take place before kiddushin. This is a daas yachid [less than a minority opinion].) Rav Moshe Soloveichik zt"l (son of R' Chaim) answered that this Bracha was instituted with the historical facts of marriage in mind (Hil. Ishis 1:1 & 4): before matan torah, there was only chuppa. No other type of marriage existed. After matan Torah, the kiddushin, our halachik framework of marriage was created, hence the bracha lists chuppa before kiddushin, because the institution of chuppa existed before the institution of kiddushin.
In the text of the birkas eirusin (see Kesubos 7) we say "v'asar lanu es ha'arusos," that conjugal relations are forbidden between a man and his betrothed (i.e., the ring was given but they didn't have chupah & sheva brachos yet. That stage is called both kiddushin and nesuin; I'll use those terms interchangably). Nearly all rishonim explain this to mean it's prohibited midirabnan. (See Rambam that even one who was mekadesh with biah is asur lavo aleha again before chuppa.) However, the Shita Mikubetzes (Kesubos 7b s.v. vz"l haRashba) brings the Raavad (personally, I'm not sure if this is the same Raavad as the Hasagos Haraavad, based on his comment at the beginning of hilchos Ishus) that when we say "v'asar lanu es ha'arusos," it means she is forbidden midioraissa. How can this be explained? My Rebbi Rav Ahron zt"l explained that first of all, the Raavad held like Rabbeinu Nissim Gaon in Tosfos Kiddushin 10a s.v. Kol that "ki yikach ish isha" is referring to nisuin, not eirusin. And second of all, the Raavad agrees with the Rambam (SHM Lo Sasaseh 355) that it is asur midioraissa to have conjugal relations with a woman without chuppa v'kiddushin, and basically the Raavad holds it's an issur aseh (the positive commandment not to have relations makes it prohibited, but lav haba miclal asei, asei - see Rambam SHM Shoresh 6). Thus conjugal relations before chuppa has taken place, even between a betrothed couple, is assur midioraissa according to the Raavad. Ramban, in a teshuva (284) says "v'asar lanu es haarusos" tells us it's only prohibited for a marriage without bracha. But without a marriage, you don't need a bracha. (Does this lead logically to R' Henkin's position [stay tuned for that]?)
Once we're on the topic of birchas erusin, why is the text of the bracha "mekadesh es amo yisrael al yidei chuppa v'kiddushin," if kiddushin (eirusin) takes place before the chuppa? (Note: the Mishna Lamelech says that the Rambam holds chuppa may take place before kiddushin. This is a daas yachid [less than a minority opinion].) Rav Moshe Soloveichik zt"l (son of R' Chaim) answered that this Bracha was instituted with the historical facts of marriage in mind (Hil. Ishis 1:1 & 4): before matan torah, there was only chuppa. No other type of marriage existed. After matan Torah, the kiddushin, our halachik framework of marriage was created, hence the bracha lists chuppa before kiddushin, because the institution of chuppa existed before the institution of kiddushin.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Pilegesh, Part 3
לז"נ זקני שמואל בן משה ז"ל נפטר כ' אייר תשמ"ט
Shitas Rabbeinu Yonah
Rabbeinu Yonah Shaarei Teshuva Shaar 3:94-95: The Pasuk (Devarim 19:29) states Do not profane your daughter l'haznosah, and the do not corrupt the land and the land will be full of harlotry. Our sages taught (Sanhedrin 66a) this verse comes to warn us not to give your pnuyah (unbetrothed, unmarried) daughter for a conjugal relationship which is not for marriage. "And the land shall not be corrupted" if you do this, the land will be full of harlotry and will make its produce in another place and not in your land. Similarly it says (Yirmiya 3:3) the rain has been withheld and there was no precipitaion, you have had the forehead of a harlot. And pilagshim (concubines) without kesubah and kiddushin were not allowed to anyone except a king, whom everyone fears, and no one will commit adultery with her. Therefore, the relationship (yichud) of a king and pilegesh is like marriage. After pilagshim were allowed to a king, our sages decreed on a bride without the birchos nisuin (sheva brachos) is prohibited to her husband like a menstruating woman (see Kalah 1:1. Shita Mekubetzes, Kesubos 7b mentions this law from Maseches Kalah, but not in the historical context that Rabbeinu Yonah says.) [95] And behold you have seen the great punishment of one who has a specific pnuyah for illicit relations, because it is written about this (Vayikra 19:29) and do not corrupt the land and the land will be full of harlotry. One who comes on a pnuyah once by a chance occurance (i.e., a "one-night stand," not a relationship) gets makas mardus (rabbinic lashes) (see this post), besides for the great stumbling block and the bad things that happen to those who live with a pnuyah, because she is too embarrassed to immerse due to her mensural impurity in a mikva lest her illicit acts become public, therefore she remains in her menstural impurity [which is a chiyuv kareis]....
Rav Ahron zt"l said the Rabbeinu Yonah holds one receives malkos dioraissa for a common law marriage. I guess he infers this from the beginning of 3:94, that the pasuk (Devarim 19:29) is prohibiting a relationship that is not kiddushin - also known as common-law marriage, so as pshat in the passuk, its punishment is malkus. The Rambam holds there is no malkos midioraissa for this.
The Ramban (Tshuva 284) holds that it is mutar to have a pilegesh but writes, "And, our master (Rabeinu Yonah, to whom this tshuva was sent), in your place warn people against having a pilegesh, for if they knew it was allowed they will be adulterous and break through [the boundaries] and cohabit with them in their state of niddah." So it's muttar but you should not do it. But, is it mutar for an unmarried woman to go to the mikvah? Not really. Shu"t Rivash 425 quotes the Ramban as explaining the Gemara in Shabbos 13b that when a woman will not be allowed to live with her husband, she may not immerse in the mikvah. Any woman who will not be allowed to her husband is prohibited from immersing in the mikvah, and this prohibition extends to unmarried women as well.
Shitas Rabbeinu Yonah
Rabbeinu Yonah Shaarei Teshuva Shaar 3:94-95: The Pasuk (Devarim 19:29) states Do not profane your daughter l'haznosah, and the do not corrupt the land and the land will be full of harlotry. Our sages taught (Sanhedrin 66a) this verse comes to warn us not to give your pnuyah (unbetrothed, unmarried) daughter for a conjugal relationship which is not for marriage. "And the land shall not be corrupted" if you do this, the land will be full of harlotry and will make its produce in another place and not in your land. Similarly it says (Yirmiya 3:3) the rain has been withheld and there was no precipitaion, you have had the forehead of a harlot. And pilagshim (concubines) without kesubah and kiddushin were not allowed to anyone except a king, whom everyone fears, and no one will commit adultery with her. Therefore, the relationship (yichud) of a king and pilegesh is like marriage. After pilagshim were allowed to a king, our sages decreed on a bride without the birchos nisuin (sheva brachos) is prohibited to her husband like a menstruating woman (see Kalah 1:1. Shita Mekubetzes, Kesubos 7b mentions this law from Maseches Kalah, but not in the historical context that Rabbeinu Yonah says.) [95] And behold you have seen the great punishment of one who has a specific pnuyah for illicit relations, because it is written about this (Vayikra 19:29) and do not corrupt the land and the land will be full of harlotry. One who comes on a pnuyah once by a chance occurance (i.e., a "one-night stand," not a relationship) gets makas mardus (rabbinic lashes) (see this post), besides for the great stumbling block and the bad things that happen to those who live with a pnuyah, because she is too embarrassed to immerse due to her mensural impurity in a mikva lest her illicit acts become public, therefore she remains in her menstural impurity [which is a chiyuv kareis]....
Rav Ahron zt"l said the Rabbeinu Yonah holds one receives malkos dioraissa for a common law marriage. I guess he infers this from the beginning of 3:94, that the pasuk (Devarim 19:29) is prohibiting a relationship that is not kiddushin - also known as common-law marriage, so as pshat in the passuk, its punishment is malkus. The Rambam holds there is no malkos midioraissa for this.
The Ramban (Tshuva 284) holds that it is mutar to have a pilegesh but writes, "And, our master (Rabeinu Yonah, to whom this tshuva was sent), in your place warn people against having a pilegesh, for if they knew it was allowed they will be adulterous and break through [the boundaries] and cohabit with them in their state of niddah." So it's muttar but you should not do it. But, is it mutar for an unmarried woman to go to the mikvah? Not really. Shu"t Rivash 425 quotes the Ramban as explaining the Gemara in Shabbos 13b that when a woman will not be allowed to live with her husband, she may not immerse in the mikvah. Any woman who will not be allowed to her husband is prohibited from immersing in the mikvah, and this prohibition extends to unmarried women as well.
Monday, May 11, 2009
Pilegesh, part 2
Shitas HaRambam
Melachim 4:4: Similarly [the king] may take from all the borders of Israel wives and pilagshim: wives with kesubah and kiddushin, and pilagshim without kesubah and without kiddushin, just with yichud (does he mean seclusion, or her being chosen or designated even before the seclusion with the king ever took place? In other words, is he using Yichud in the ishus meaning or not?) alone does he acquire her and she is permitted to him. But a hedyot is forbidden to have a pilegesh except for an amah ha'ivriah after yiud.
The Rambam's opinion is very clear that a pilegesh is only allowed for a king, and a commoner does not have a pilegesh except for ama ha'ivriah after yiud. There is no concept of common-law marriage as the definition of pilegesh. He holds Yiud obligates a man to provide for this woman as his wife, but this obligation did not take place through kiddushin. So the result is the same as marriage, but the mechanism is different - amah ha'ivriah with yiud versus regular kiddushin. In fact, the Rambam does not list the laws of yiud in Hilchos Ishus. They are codified in the fourth chapter of Hilchos Avadim. But some mechanism is needed to become "married," so a common-law relationship would not even be considered a pilegesh.
הלכות אישות פרק א
[א] קודם מתן תורה, היה אדם פוגע אישה בשוק--אם רצה הוא והיא לישא אותה--מכניסה לביתו ובועלה בינו לבין עצמו, ותהיה לו לאישה. כיון שניתנה תורה, נצטוו ישראל שאם ירצה האיש לישא אישה--יקנה אותה תחילה בפני עדים, ואחר כך תהיה לו לאישה: שנאמר "כי ייקח איש, אישה; ובא אליה" (דברים כב,יג).
[ד] קודם מתן תורה, היה אדם פוגע אישה בשוק--אם רצה הוא והיא--נותן לה שכרה, ובועל אותה על אם הדרך והולך לו; וזו היא הנקראת קדשה. משניתנה התורה, נאסרה הקדשה--שנאמר "לא תהיה קדשה, מבנות ישראל" (דברים כג,יח); לפיכך כל הבועל אישה לשם זנות, בלא קידושין--לוקה מן התורה, מפני שבעל קדשה.
We see what marriage is, we see what a kedeisha (commonly translated as prostitute) is - she will have a sexual relationship with anyone. Note that he does not discuss an intermediate case of common-law marriage - where she has a sexual relationship only with one person, but without kiddushin. Rav Ahron zt"l said that there are two parts to full ishus - the ishus of a non-Jew, which is the ishus of before matan Torah, and the second part is chuppa with eidim. I don't remember the context in which he said this, or what question he was answering with this.
Ravad 1:4 says that a common law marriage - where one woman had an exclusive relationship with one man is not assur midioraissa, and that is called a pilegesh.
Maggid Mishna 1:4 says the Rambam's opinion is that pilagshim have kiddushin but no kesubah. The Kesef Mishna (1:4) asks against the Maggid Mishna that the Rambam in Hilchos Melachim (4:4) explicitly says pilagshim have neither kiddushin or kesubah. Kesef Mishna also points out hw the Ramban in the teshuva also misrepresents the shitas Harambam, also by apparently not having the text of Hilchos Melachim as we do.
Some, including Ramban (Teshuva 284) ask against Rambam why a king can have pilegesh and a hedyot can't, that there is no source for it. We see, however, that Rabbeinu Yonah (Shaarei Teshuva 3:94) says "that a king, whom everyone fears, and no one will commit adultery with her." So that is reason enough to distinguish a king from a commoner. Margalios Hayam, Sanhedrin 21a paragraph 10 brings a similar Maharit: since a pilegesh of a king is forbidden to everyone else, she is not a kedeisha. Note: Many, including Margalios Hayam, ask against Rambam that Gidon was allowed to have a pilegesh because he was shofet - interesting source: see Frankel edition, Rambam Hil. Terumos 1:2, and Semag that a shofet is like a king for kibush rabim, hence a shofet may have a pilegesh (See Rav Ahron Soloveichik, Perach Mateh Aharon Ahava p. 159: A shofet cannot effect kibush rabim because he is only the leader over individuals, whereas a melech can, because he is the leader over all of Yisrael as one unit, not as many individuals. He published this piece in the 1960s in a Beis Yitzchok (RIETS) before the Frankel edition of Rambam was published and showed from manuscripts that a shofet does effect kibbush rabim; I never saw him use the Frankel Rambam even in the 1990s.) Note that this would not answer Ramban's question that we saw that the Pilegesh B'givah incident was where a commoner had a pilegesh. Rambam would answer simply that in those cases, a pilegesh was a woman who was originally an amah ha'ivriah, with yiud.
Melachim 4:4: Similarly [the king] may take from all the borders of Israel wives and pilagshim: wives with kesubah and kiddushin, and pilagshim without kesubah and without kiddushin, just with yichud (does he mean seclusion, or her being chosen or designated even before the seclusion with the king ever took place? In other words, is he using Yichud in the ishus meaning or not?) alone does he acquire her and she is permitted to him. But a hedyot is forbidden to have a pilegesh except for an amah ha'ivriah after yiud.
The Rambam's opinion is very clear that a pilegesh is only allowed for a king, and a commoner does not have a pilegesh except for ama ha'ivriah after yiud. There is no concept of common-law marriage as the definition of pilegesh. He holds Yiud obligates a man to provide for this woman as his wife, but this obligation did not take place through kiddushin. So the result is the same as marriage, but the mechanism is different - amah ha'ivriah with yiud versus regular kiddushin. In fact, the Rambam does not list the laws of yiud in Hilchos Ishus. They are codified in the fourth chapter of Hilchos Avadim. But some mechanism is needed to become "married," so a common-law relationship would not even be considered a pilegesh.
הלכות אישות פרק א
[א] קודם מתן תורה, היה אדם פוגע אישה בשוק--אם רצה הוא והיא לישא אותה--מכניסה לביתו ובועלה בינו לבין עצמו, ותהיה לו לאישה. כיון שניתנה תורה, נצטוו ישראל שאם ירצה האיש לישא אישה--יקנה אותה תחילה בפני עדים, ואחר כך תהיה לו לאישה: שנאמר "כי ייקח איש, אישה; ובא אליה" (דברים כב,יג).
[ד] קודם מתן תורה, היה אדם פוגע אישה בשוק--אם רצה הוא והיא--נותן לה שכרה, ובועל אותה על אם הדרך והולך לו; וזו היא הנקראת קדשה. משניתנה התורה, נאסרה הקדשה--שנאמר "לא תהיה קדשה, מבנות ישראל" (דברים כג,יח); לפיכך כל הבועל אישה לשם זנות, בלא קידושין--לוקה מן התורה, מפני שבעל קדשה.
We see what marriage is, we see what a kedeisha (commonly translated as prostitute) is - she will have a sexual relationship with anyone. Note that he does not discuss an intermediate case of common-law marriage - where she has a sexual relationship only with one person, but without kiddushin. Rav Ahron zt"l said that there are two parts to full ishus - the ishus of a non-Jew, which is the ishus of before matan Torah, and the second part is chuppa with eidim. I don't remember the context in which he said this, or what question he was answering with this.
Ravad 1:4 says that a common law marriage - where one woman had an exclusive relationship with one man is not assur midioraissa, and that is called a pilegesh.
Maggid Mishna 1:4 says the Rambam's opinion is that pilagshim have kiddushin but no kesubah. The Kesef Mishna (1:4) asks against the Maggid Mishna that the Rambam in Hilchos Melachim (4:4) explicitly says pilagshim have neither kiddushin or kesubah. Kesef Mishna also points out hw the Ramban in the teshuva also misrepresents the shitas Harambam, also by apparently not having the text of Hilchos Melachim as we do.
Some, including Ramban (Teshuva 284) ask against Rambam why a king can have pilegesh and a hedyot can't, that there is no source for it. We see, however, that Rabbeinu Yonah (Shaarei Teshuva 3:94) says "that a king, whom everyone fears, and no one will commit adultery with her." So that is reason enough to distinguish a king from a commoner. Margalios Hayam, Sanhedrin 21a paragraph 10 brings a similar Maharit: since a pilegesh of a king is forbidden to everyone else, she is not a kedeisha. Note: Many, including Margalios Hayam, ask against Rambam that Gidon was allowed to have a pilegesh because he was shofet - interesting source: see Frankel edition, Rambam Hil. Terumos 1:2, and Semag that a shofet is like a king for kibush rabim, hence a shofet may have a pilegesh (See Rav Ahron Soloveichik, Perach Mateh Aharon Ahava p. 159: A shofet cannot effect kibush rabim because he is only the leader over individuals, whereas a melech can, because he is the leader over all of Yisrael as one unit, not as many individuals. He published this piece in the 1960s in a Beis Yitzchok (RIETS) before the Frankel edition of Rambam was published and showed from manuscripts that a shofet does effect kibbush rabim; I never saw him use the Frankel Rambam even in the 1990s.) Note that this would not answer Ramban's question that we saw that the Pilegesh B'givah incident was where a commoner had a pilegesh. Rambam would answer simply that in those cases, a pilegesh was a woman who was originally an amah ha'ivriah, with yiud.
Sunday, May 10, 2009
Isha Zonah Vachalala Lo Yikachu
אִשָּׁה זֹנָה וַחֲלָלָה לֹא יִקָּחוּ (Vayikra 21:7)
Look at the roshei teivos (first letter of each word) - אזולי - AZULAI. Some suggest that this is the origin of the name Azulai, and it is a family name for kohanim. I heard once, but I haven't found confirmation, that it is a family name for chalalim (so people know of their psul).
Look at the roshei teivos (first letter of each word) - אזולי - AZULAI. Some suggest that this is the origin of the name Azulai, and it is a family name for kohanim. I heard once, but I haven't found confirmation, that it is a family name for chalalim (so people know of their psul).
Thursday, April 30, 2009
Ramban & Ibn Ezra - Uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael
The following was first published in Parsha Pearls, Chayei Sarah 2001 (year not on the original) by yours truly and is presented here in its entirety for Yom Ha'atzma'ut, and also for Parshas Kedoshim.
In this week's Parsha, we learn all that Avraham did in order to procure a burial plot for his wife, Sarah. Why did the Torah deem it necessary for us to know all these facts?
The ibn Ezra explains (23:18) that the Torah wished to show us two things. One, the importance of Eretz Yisrael for both the living and the dead, and two, the fulfillment of Hashem's promise to Avraham that Eretz Yisrael will belong to him and his descendants.
The Ramban (23:19) askes on the explanations of the ibn Ezra: How does this epsode illustrate the uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael for the living and the dead, just because Sarah died in Eretz Yisrael, and was buried there and not elsewhere. (If, however, she had died outside of Eretz Yisrael and was brought there for burial, this would illustrate the uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael.) Furthermore, the Ramban asks, Hashem's promise was to give the entire Eretz Yisrael to the descendents of Avraham, and this episode only refers to one small field. How do we see a fulfillment of Hashem's promise to Avraham?
The Ramban therefore writes that the Torah showed us this episode for two other reasons. One, to show us that Avraham was well respected by the Bnei Cheis, a fulfillment of the divine promise of "va'agadlah shimecha - And I will make your name great." (See Perek 12, Passuk 2.) Two, to record for us the location of the graves of our forefatehrs so that we can honor those places.
My rebbie, Harav Moshe Soloveichik, Shlit"a, suggested an answer to the questions of the Ramban on the ibn Ezra. Reb Moshe said that Avraham insisted on buying the fields from Efron, while he could have acquired it from him for free. This was to show that Eretz Yisrael is our land. The definition of Eretz Yisrael, as explained by Reb Yoshe Ber, and the roshe HaYeshiva, zt"l, is that which belongs to every Jew, not as shutfus (partnership). Avraham's purchasing the field from Efron made the field belong to the Jewish people. This answers the second question of the Ramban, because now that the land belongs to every Jew, there is a fulfillment of Hashem's promise. The answer to the first question of the Ramban can be seen by the differences that exist between the purchases of different pieces of property. When one buys a regular piece of property, like a house, he may eventually sell it. The purchase of a grave, however, is eternal. To illustrate this point, Reb Moshe gave the example of Har hazeisim: the fact that there is a cemetery prevents its being given away. In this way one can still be a supporter of Eretz Yisrael, even upon death.
I would like to add that the explanations of the ibn Ezra and Ramban are influenced by the way they define the uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael. The Ramban in Sefer Vayikra, Perek 18, Passuk 25, in addressing why Eretz Yisrael will eject sinners, explains that when Hashem created everything, He established a star or sign for each place. However, He created no such sign for Eretz Yisrael. Hashem Himself is the sign for Eretz Yisrael, and as such it is a holy place that cannot tolerate sinners. The Ramban says therefore that the kedusha of Eretz Yisrael is due to an external force [i.e., Hashem as the sign -ed.] , and as such he cannot learn the uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael from this episode. This is because he feels it was special for a different reason, not contained in this episode. The ibn Ezra, on the other hand, holds that Eretz Yisrael is special due to maasim (deeds) we do, and therefore we can learn the uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael from this Parsha, for it displays the great maasim of Avraham.
In this week's Parsha, we learn all that Avraham did in order to procure a burial plot for his wife, Sarah. Why did the Torah deem it necessary for us to know all these facts?
The ibn Ezra explains (23:18) that the Torah wished to show us two things. One, the importance of Eretz Yisrael for both the living and the dead, and two, the fulfillment of Hashem's promise to Avraham that Eretz Yisrael will belong to him and his descendants.
The Ramban (23:19) askes on the explanations of the ibn Ezra: How does this epsode illustrate the uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael for the living and the dead, just because Sarah died in Eretz Yisrael, and was buried there and not elsewhere. (If, however, she had died outside of Eretz Yisrael and was brought there for burial, this would illustrate the uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael.) Furthermore, the Ramban asks, Hashem's promise was to give the entire Eretz Yisrael to the descendents of Avraham, and this episode only refers to one small field. How do we see a fulfillment of Hashem's promise to Avraham?
The Ramban therefore writes that the Torah showed us this episode for two other reasons. One, to show us that Avraham was well respected by the Bnei Cheis, a fulfillment of the divine promise of "va'agadlah shimecha - And I will make your name great." (See Perek 12, Passuk 2.) Two, to record for us the location of the graves of our forefatehrs so that we can honor those places.
My rebbie, Harav Moshe Soloveichik, Shlit"a, suggested an answer to the questions of the Ramban on the ibn Ezra. Reb Moshe said that Avraham insisted on buying the fields from Efron, while he could have acquired it from him for free. This was to show that Eretz Yisrael is our land. The definition of Eretz Yisrael, as explained by Reb Yoshe Ber, and the roshe HaYeshiva, zt"l, is that which belongs to every Jew, not as shutfus (partnership). Avraham's purchasing the field from Efron made the field belong to the Jewish people. This answers the second question of the Ramban, because now that the land belongs to every Jew, there is a fulfillment of Hashem's promise. The answer to the first question of the Ramban can be seen by the differences that exist between the purchases of different pieces of property. When one buys a regular piece of property, like a house, he may eventually sell it. The purchase of a grave, however, is eternal. To illustrate this point, Reb Moshe gave the example of Har hazeisim: the fact that there is a cemetery prevents its being given away. In this way one can still be a supporter of Eretz Yisrael, even upon death.
I would like to add that the explanations of the ibn Ezra and Ramban are influenced by the way they define the uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael. The Ramban in Sefer Vayikra, Perek 18, Passuk 25, in addressing why Eretz Yisrael will eject sinners, explains that when Hashem created everything, He established a star or sign for each place. However, He created no such sign for Eretz Yisrael. Hashem Himself is the sign for Eretz Yisrael, and as such it is a holy place that cannot tolerate sinners. The Ramban says therefore that the kedusha of Eretz Yisrael is due to an external force [i.e., Hashem as the sign -ed.] , and as such he cannot learn the uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael from this episode. This is because he feels it was special for a different reason, not contained in this episode. The ibn Ezra, on the other hand, holds that Eretz Yisrael is special due to maasim (deeds) we do, and therefore we can learn the uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael from this Parsha, for it displays the great maasim of Avraham.
Monday, April 20, 2009
Schlissle Challa Minhag Explained
One year the shabbos after pesach, I was at someone's house, and they had baked a key in their challa. They told me it's a called schlissle challa and is (like so many other things) a segula for parnossa or something.
Last shabbos I figured out a rationale for this minhag (but not the connection to parnassa), why bake a key into the challa on the shabbos after pesach. First of all, it depends on having the minhag to give your key to the goy to whom you sell your chametz when you sell your chametz. Once you have that minhag, it makes sense that on the shabbos after Pesach, when you've bought your chametz back from the goy, you bake that key in a challa, to demonstrate that you again own your chametz (represented by the challa). Maybe the parnassa thing comes from the fact this key was used in a business transaction (the sale of the chametz) and you successfully completed that deal, so you hope your successful streak continues.
Last shabbos I figured out a rationale for this minhag (but not the connection to parnassa), why bake a key into the challa on the shabbos after pesach. First of all, it depends on having the minhag to give your key to the goy to whom you sell your chametz when you sell your chametz. Once you have that minhag, it makes sense that on the shabbos after Pesach, when you've bought your chametz back from the goy, you bake that key in a challa, to demonstrate that you again own your chametz (represented by the challa). Maybe the parnassa thing comes from the fact this key was used in a business transaction (the sale of the chametz) and you successfully completed that deal, so you hope your successful streak continues.
Sunday, April 12, 2009
Looking Back - More Sources
In memory of my friend Yonatan ben Nachum who passed away Shabbos morning. In honor of my friend Jacob, who became a bone marrow stem cell donor in Yoni's zechus (and in trying to find a match for Yoni).
Note: If I have additional sources I post them as comments to their relevant posts. This post in an exception.
Over Yom Tov, I was looking through R' Chayim Heller's sefer Hamitzvos and want to add some references to previous posts. Page numbers are to Sefer Hamitzvos Leharambam, Mahaduras Hagaon Rabi Chayim Heller, published by Mossad Harav Kook.
Related to post Freeing your slave, part 3: Saving Soviet Jewry - A new book, David Avdi, about Rabbi Dr. David Appelbaum zt"l H"yd, a tzaddik and talmid chacham, includes two chapters - one in Hebrew and one in English - about an Israeli intelligence operation called Nativ whose purpose was to reach out to and support Soviet Jewry and encourage their attachment to Judaism, Zionism and Israel - often at great risk to both Nativ operatives and Soviet refuseniks (David Avdi, p. 48). Rav Dovid zt"l travelled to the Soviet Union (on the strength of his American passport) to teach Torah and bring support to Soviet Jewry.
R' Chayim Heller discusses about putting yourself in safek sakana to save someone else on p. 174 note 11.
R' Aaron Rakeffet (Rothkoff) recruited Rav Dovid for this operation, and I've heard he plans to publish some of his experiences in his forthcoming memoirs.
Related to Post Parshas Ki Sisa-Kiyor: see p. 24 note 8 meshichas klei hamikdash - he feels there is a contradiction between Sefer Hamitzvos and Mishna Torah if being moshech the keilim is a mitzvah ledoros or only in the midbar.
Related to post Makos Mardus see p. 32 note 83 malkin ad shetetzei nafsho, some say you don't actually hit him till he dies, but R' Heller seems to say those opinions are not borne out by other meimras.
Related to post Hosafa to Parshas Ki Sisa, Kiyor end, what Rav Chaim said - see p. 43 If someone who enters the heichal without washing at the Kiyor, even if he does not enter to do avodah, if he's chayav misah. R' Chayim Heller doesn't discuss it, but would this apply to Moshe according to the makshe in Tosfos Avodah Zarah 34? Also, on the same page regarding the source of the law that the kiyor must have enough water to wash 4 kohanim - apparently someone changed Rambam's girsa to use Rashi's pasuk.
Indirectly related to Prohibition against intermarriage post see p. 109 note 18 if you get malkus for being boel aramis even if it is not ishus.
Not related to a previous post, but is related to Daf 87b - see p. 186 note 21 - Yam Shel Shlomo Yevamos says the Rambam doesn't pasken like this gemara (about a father's ne'emanus on his son), but the Rambam does pasken it in Isurei Biah 15:16. Very strange Yam Shel Shlomo.
Note: If I have additional sources I post them as comments to their relevant posts. This post in an exception.
Over Yom Tov, I was looking through R' Chayim Heller's sefer Hamitzvos and want to add some references to previous posts. Page numbers are to Sefer Hamitzvos Leharambam, Mahaduras Hagaon Rabi Chayim Heller, published by Mossad Harav Kook.
Related to post Freeing your slave, part 3: Saving Soviet Jewry - A new book, David Avdi, about Rabbi Dr. David Appelbaum zt"l H"yd, a tzaddik and talmid chacham, includes two chapters - one in Hebrew and one in English - about an Israeli intelligence operation called Nativ whose purpose was to reach out to and support Soviet Jewry and encourage their attachment to Judaism, Zionism and Israel - often at great risk to both Nativ operatives and Soviet refuseniks (David Avdi, p. 48). Rav Dovid zt"l travelled to the Soviet Union (on the strength of his American passport) to teach Torah and bring support to Soviet Jewry.
R' Chayim Heller discusses about putting yourself in safek sakana to save someone else on p. 174 note 11.
R' Aaron Rakeffet (Rothkoff) recruited Rav Dovid for this operation, and I've heard he plans to publish some of his experiences in his forthcoming memoirs.
Related to Post Parshas Ki Sisa-Kiyor: see p. 24 note 8 meshichas klei hamikdash - he feels there is a contradiction between Sefer Hamitzvos and Mishna Torah if being moshech the keilim is a mitzvah ledoros or only in the midbar.
Related to post Makos Mardus see p. 32 note 83 malkin ad shetetzei nafsho, some say you don't actually hit him till he dies, but R' Heller seems to say those opinions are not borne out by other meimras.
Related to post Hosafa to Parshas Ki Sisa, Kiyor end, what Rav Chaim said - see p. 43 If someone who enters the heichal without washing at the Kiyor, even if he does not enter to do avodah, if he's chayav misah. R' Chayim Heller doesn't discuss it, but would this apply to Moshe according to the makshe in Tosfos Avodah Zarah 34? Also, on the same page regarding the source of the law that the kiyor must have enough water to wash 4 kohanim - apparently someone changed Rambam's girsa to use Rashi's pasuk.
Indirectly related to Prohibition against intermarriage post see p. 109 note 18 if you get malkus for being boel aramis even if it is not ishus.
Not related to a previous post, but is related to Daf 87b - see p. 186 note 21 - Yam Shel Shlomo Yevamos says the Rambam doesn't pasken like this gemara (about a father's ne'emanus on his son), but the Rambam does pasken it in Isurei Biah 15:16. Very strange Yam Shel Shlomo.
Tuesday, April 7, 2009
Seder: Revava k'tzemach hasadeh
R' Gil inspired this with this post. It lacks a little polish, I apologize; I didn't have enough time to properly finish it.
I once gave a drasha in honor of my Bubbie, and part of it was this: Kiddushin 49b says that 10 measures of yofi came to the world and Jerusalem took 9 of them. What does this mean? The gemara a few lines lower says that the pasuk in Shir Hashirim 8 "achos ketana yesh lanu v'shadayim ain la" refers to Eilam that merited to learn Torah but not to teach torah. So the breasts represent the source of spiritual sustenance, (see also my Rebbie's zt"l hesped for his brother the Rav zt"l - about "birchos shadayim v'racham") and this is the yofi of Yerushalayim: Bava Basra 21a discusses the educational system and how Ben Gamla is to be commended for without him, Torah would have been forgotten in Israel. One of the takanos in teaching was that the children should be brought to Yerushalayim to learn as the pasuk says (Yeshaya 2) "ki mitzion teitzei Torah u'Dvar Hashem Miyrushalayim." Tosfos, s.v. Ki Mitzion says "because they would see great holiness and Kohanim busy in the Avodah, it would direct the heart more to the fear of heaven and to learn Torah, as the Sifrei expounds on the pasuk "l'maan tilmad l'yirah." Great is Maaser Sheni that it brings to [Torah] study, because they would stand in Yerushalayim until he ate his Maaser Sheni and he would see everyone busy in the work of heaven and avodah, he would also be directed toward yiras shamayim and to busy himself with Torah." Also, Rambam Mamrim 1:1 says בית דין הגדול שבירושלים--הם עיקר תורה שבעל פה,
והם עמוד ההוראה, ומהם חוק ומשפט יוצא לכל ישראל. The beis din hagadol in Yerushalayim - they are the main Torah Sheb'al peh, and the pillar of direction (as in teaching or psak), and from them, law and justice emanates to all of Yisrael.
In this context at the seder, shadayim nachonu, the bnei yisrael had the potential to start a great mesoratic tradition but "at eryom v'ervah," we were naked of mitzvos. We had nothing to transmit.
Now, on Pesach night, when we have to see ourselves as being freed from Egypt, a time when the Jews were were commanded several mitzvos, and specifically the seder night with the mitzvah of "vehigadta levincha" which includes teaching the halachos of the seder, not only the story of the exodus (see the answer to the Ben Chacham, and see Hagaddah Siach Hagrid), we have a responsibility and an obligation to teach Torah to our children (and other people).
(The night of the seder is indeed dedicated to the mesorah, as we have a requirement to recite the drashos on the psukim of bikkurim. My rebbe shlit"a mentioned Tshuvos Hagaonim against those who skipped the drashos, they were suspected of being karaim. I think the Rav in Siach Hagrid also discussed the importance of reciting the drashos.)
(Back to my bubbie - I said she transmitted to me Torah attitudes. She taught me how to give tzedaka. She taught me how to respect talmidei chachamim. She told me how to soak and salt meat, to kasher it, etc.)
I once gave a drasha in honor of my Bubbie, and part of it was this: Kiddushin 49b says that 10 measures of yofi came to the world and Jerusalem took 9 of them. What does this mean? The gemara a few lines lower says that the pasuk in Shir Hashirim 8 "achos ketana yesh lanu v'shadayim ain la" refers to Eilam that merited to learn Torah but not to teach torah. So the breasts represent the source of spiritual sustenance, (see also my Rebbie's zt"l hesped for his brother the Rav zt"l - about "birchos shadayim v'racham") and this is the yofi of Yerushalayim: Bava Basra 21a discusses the educational system and how Ben Gamla is to be commended for without him, Torah would have been forgotten in Israel. One of the takanos in teaching was that the children should be brought to Yerushalayim to learn as the pasuk says (Yeshaya 2) "ki mitzion teitzei Torah u'Dvar Hashem Miyrushalayim." Tosfos, s.v. Ki Mitzion says "because they would see great holiness and Kohanim busy in the Avodah, it would direct the heart more to the fear of heaven and to learn Torah, as the Sifrei expounds on the pasuk "l'maan tilmad l'yirah." Great is Maaser Sheni that it brings to [Torah] study, because they would stand in Yerushalayim until he ate his Maaser Sheni and he would see everyone busy in the work of heaven and avodah, he would also be directed toward yiras shamayim and to busy himself with Torah." Also, Rambam Mamrim 1:1 says בית דין הגדול שבירושלים--הם עיקר תורה שבעל פה,
והם עמוד ההוראה, ומהם חוק ומשפט יוצא לכל ישראל. The beis din hagadol in Yerushalayim - they are the main Torah Sheb'al peh, and the pillar of direction (as in teaching or psak), and from them, law and justice emanates to all of Yisrael.
In this context at the seder, shadayim nachonu, the bnei yisrael had the potential to start a great mesoratic tradition but "at eryom v'ervah," we were naked of mitzvos. We had nothing to transmit.
Now, on Pesach night, when we have to see ourselves as being freed from Egypt, a time when the Jews were were commanded several mitzvos, and specifically the seder night with the mitzvah of "vehigadta levincha" which includes teaching the halachos of the seder, not only the story of the exodus (see the answer to the Ben Chacham, and see Hagaddah Siach Hagrid), we have a responsibility and an obligation to teach Torah to our children (and other people).
(The night of the seder is indeed dedicated to the mesorah, as we have a requirement to recite the drashos on the psukim of bikkurim. My rebbe shlit"a mentioned Tshuvos Hagaonim against those who skipped the drashos, they were suspected of being karaim. I think the Rav in Siach Hagrid also discussed the importance of reciting the drashos.)
(Back to my bubbie - I said she transmitted to me Torah attitudes. She taught me how to give tzedaka. She taught me how to respect talmidei chachamim. She told me how to soak and salt meat, to kasher it, etc.)
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
Pilegesh - Part 1
There is a machlokes Rishonim if it's mutar to have a pilegesh, but even if it is theoretically mutar midioraissa, it's practically (l'maaseh) prohibited. I will present sources from many places to paint a unique picture of pilegesh, and many of the involved issues.
The first source is Rashi & Ramban on Breishis 25:6, based on Sanhedrin 21a. The Gemara there says: Nashim (wives) are with kiddushin and kesubah, and pilagshim (concubines) are without kiddushin and kesubah. Rashi in Breishis says "nashim are with kesubah and pilagshim are without kesubah," Ramban asks against Rashi for implying pilegesh has kiddushin, and only lacks kesubah. (One point: Ramban asks that kesubah is only dirabanan, that's not so clear; most rishonim agree with that, but Tosfos, Kesubos 10a s.v. amar brings an opinion that kesubah is dioraissa.) Rashi may be based on Rabi Meir's opinion in Yerushalmi Kesubos 5:2.
The first source is Rashi & Ramban on Breishis 25:6, based on Sanhedrin 21a. The Gemara there says: Nashim (wives) are with kiddushin and kesubah, and pilagshim (concubines) are without kiddushin and kesubah. Rashi in Breishis says "nashim are with kesubah and pilagshim are without kesubah," Ramban asks against Rashi for implying pilegesh has kiddushin, and only lacks kesubah. (One point: Ramban asks that kesubah is only dirabanan, that's not so clear; most rishonim agree with that, but Tosfos, Kesubos 10a s.v. amar brings an opinion that kesubah is dioraissa.) Rashi may be based on Rabi Meir's opinion in Yerushalmi Kesubos 5:2.
Thursday, March 26, 2009
Hosafa to Parshas Ki Sisa: Kiyor
Of central importance to this post was the idea that Rashi held that Moshe's service as kohen gadol during the seven inaugural days were considered as service in the mishkan itself. However, Rashi at the very end of Parshas Pikudei (40:29, see also Rashi to Pasuk 31) says something very strange. The pasuk says that Moshe brough the olah and mincha on the mizbeiach. Rashi says "Even on the eight day, the day of erecting the Mishkan, Moshe served [as Kohen Gadol] and brought the communal offerings except those [special korbanos] commanded only for that day...." So he actually served as Kohen Gadol on the eighth day, when it certainly had the status of Mishkan.
This contradicts what Rashi says in Zevachim 19b s.v. Moshe, that Moshe and Aharon did not serve as Kohen Gadol at the same time. There are other Rishonim who say that Moshe served as KG on the eighth day, see Shita Mekubetzes, Zevachim 19b 3 in the name of the Ra"m.
The Netziv in Haamek Davar, 40:23, says that there were two versions of Rashi and he changed his mind; I guess at first he felt Moshe served on the eighth day, then he changed his mind that Moshe did not serve on the eighth day. (I was not sure what the Ramban was saying in Rashi.)
See also Torah Shleima 47 and 55* at the end of Pikudei about Rashi.
There is a third opinion as to the duration of Moshe's service as Kohen Gadol. The makshe in Tosfos, Avodah Zarah 34a s.v. Bameh holds that for all 40 years (until his death) Moshe was considered Kohen Gadol. He bases it on Zevachim 101b: Rav said, Moshe was kohen gadol and took a portion form kodshai shamayim. The Gemara does not say explicitly that he was kohen gadol until his death, but that is how the maksheh in Tosfos A"Z learns.
Maybe Moshe only served as Kohen Gadol for the seven days, or even the eighth, and he never served again. But once he served, he retained some special status. (Whether people in Galus [for killing accidentally] needed to wait for Moshe's death to be free, I do not know.) Maybe the makshe in Tosfos in A"Z doesn't mean Moshe was actually the Kohen Gadol the rest of his life, but he had some special status that must have manifested himself in certain ways, like in his dress. See Shiurei Rabeinu Meshulam David Halevi Zevachim Dapim 2-25 (Jerusalem 5767, edited by A.C. Shpiegel) p.387 who brings Rav Chaim as mentioned by the Brisker Rav something along these lines: Moshe served for the seven inaugural days but that doesn't mean he lost his status after that; he was not a zar (non-Kohen) and needed to wash from the kiyor when he entered the Mishkan.
This contradicts what Rashi says in Zevachim 19b s.v. Moshe, that Moshe and Aharon did not serve as Kohen Gadol at the same time. There are other Rishonim who say that Moshe served as KG on the eighth day, see Shita Mekubetzes, Zevachim 19b 3 in the name of the Ra"m.
The Netziv in Haamek Davar, 40:23, says that there were two versions of Rashi and he changed his mind; I guess at first he felt Moshe served on the eighth day, then he changed his mind that Moshe did not serve on the eighth day. (I was not sure what the Ramban was saying in Rashi.)
See also Torah Shleima 47 and 55* at the end of Pikudei about Rashi.
There is a third opinion as to the duration of Moshe's service as Kohen Gadol. The makshe in Tosfos, Avodah Zarah 34a s.v. Bameh holds that for all 40 years (until his death) Moshe was considered Kohen Gadol. He bases it on Zevachim 101b: Rav said, Moshe was kohen gadol and took a portion form kodshai shamayim. The Gemara does not say explicitly that he was kohen gadol until his death, but that is how the maksheh in Tosfos A"Z learns.
Maybe Moshe only served as Kohen Gadol for the seven days, or even the eighth, and he never served again. But once he served, he retained some special status. (Whether people in Galus [for killing accidentally] needed to wait for Moshe's death to be free, I do not know.) Maybe the makshe in Tosfos in A"Z doesn't mean Moshe was actually the Kohen Gadol the rest of his life, but he had some special status that must have manifested himself in certain ways, like in his dress. See Shiurei Rabeinu Meshulam David Halevi Zevachim Dapim 2-25 (Jerusalem 5767, edited by A.C. Shpiegel) p.387 who brings Rav Chaim as mentioned by the Brisker Rav something along these lines: Moshe served for the seven inaugural days but that doesn't mean he lost his status after that; he was not a zar (non-Kohen) and needed to wash from the kiyor when he entered the Mishkan.
Monday, March 23, 2009
Freeing Your Slave - Part 4
What the Rishonim say about freeing your slave.
Group 1
Ritva, Gittin 38b. Rabeinu nr"u wrote, from here we see that it is not a real aseh, rather only a rabbinic prohibition, and they connected it (asmachta) to a pasuk, and Rabi Akiva who says it is an obligation, means a rabbinic obligation.
Meiri, Gittin asks on this opinion that it is only midirabanan: it does not seem so, for we certainly pasken like Rabi Akiva that is in an obligation. Furthermore, Rabi Eliezer also holds like him, but holds that the aseh, even though it is from the Torah, he was lenient in it in place of another mitzvah, since it is not equal to eveyone, since there is no obligation to acquire a slave to fulfill the mitzvah of leolam bahem taavodu. (Interesting; we'll return to that concept when we discuss zonah.)
Group 2
Ramban Gittin 38b s.v. Mitzvah Shani. And because of the mitzvah to dave with a minyan we will push aside a mitzvas aseh in the Torah? It's possible that the Torah only said leolam bahem taavodu because of the prohibition against giving them a gift for no reason (matnas chinam) like it says regarding an idolotor: lo sechaneim. But when he freed him when he (the slave) paid for himself, or because of a mitzvah or need of the master, it isn't for no reason and is allowed. And we can also answer that it does push off a mitzvah in the Torah since "when Hashem comes to a beis knesses and does not find a minyan, He immediately gets angry." (Interesting - see what I wrote in point 2 in Part 2. I hadn't seen this Ramban at that time.)
Chiddushei HaRan, Gittin 38a s.v. mitzvah shani. As if to say, the Torah did not say leolam bahem taavodu except not to free them for no reason, but when he frees him because of a mitzvah, it's like the slave paid the master for himself and is allowed.
Rashba Gittin 38b s.v. ha diamrinan asks on the first answer of Ramban: The isur of lo sechaneim does not apply to Ger Toshav and Eved Knaani. (That's his opinion; Ramban and Ran certainly held it does apply.) Rather, here because of a public mitzvah or to stop many people from an aveira (that was another case) it's allowed.
Regarding Lo Sechaneim, Rav Ahron Soloveichik had amazing Torah on this subject. See Od Yisrael Yosef B'ni Chai, Siman 3, and Perach Mateh Ahron, Hil. Avodas Kochavim 9:16.
Other
Rashba, Shabbos 4a s.v. ha diamran (near end) says that for a half-slave, half-free (where one partner in the slave freed his portion of the slave) there is no law of leolam bahem taavodu because of the free part of him.
This Rashba has no application to the case of Rabi Eliezer.
Group 1
Ritva, Gittin 38b. Rabeinu nr"u wrote, from here we see that it is not a real aseh, rather only a rabbinic prohibition, and they connected it (asmachta) to a pasuk, and Rabi Akiva who says it is an obligation, means a rabbinic obligation.
Meiri, Gittin asks on this opinion that it is only midirabanan: it does not seem so, for we certainly pasken like Rabi Akiva that is in an obligation. Furthermore, Rabi Eliezer also holds like him, but holds that the aseh, even though it is from the Torah, he was lenient in it in place of another mitzvah, since it is not equal to eveyone, since there is no obligation to acquire a slave to fulfill the mitzvah of leolam bahem taavodu. (Interesting; we'll return to that concept when we discuss zonah.)
Group 2
Ramban Gittin 38b s.v. Mitzvah Shani. And because of the mitzvah to dave with a minyan we will push aside a mitzvas aseh in the Torah? It's possible that the Torah only said leolam bahem taavodu because of the prohibition against giving them a gift for no reason (matnas chinam) like it says regarding an idolotor: lo sechaneim. But when he freed him when he (the slave) paid for himself, or because of a mitzvah or need of the master, it isn't for no reason and is allowed. And we can also answer that it does push off a mitzvah in the Torah since "when Hashem comes to a beis knesses and does not find a minyan, He immediately gets angry." (Interesting - see what I wrote in point 2 in Part 2. I hadn't seen this Ramban at that time.)
Chiddushei HaRan, Gittin 38a s.v. mitzvah shani. As if to say, the Torah did not say leolam bahem taavodu except not to free them for no reason, but when he frees him because of a mitzvah, it's like the slave paid the master for himself and is allowed.
Rashba Gittin 38b s.v. ha diamrinan asks on the first answer of Ramban: The isur of lo sechaneim does not apply to Ger Toshav and Eved Knaani. (That's his opinion; Ramban and Ran certainly held it does apply.) Rather, here because of a public mitzvah or to stop many people from an aveira (that was another case) it's allowed.
Regarding Lo Sechaneim, Rav Ahron Soloveichik had amazing Torah on this subject. See Od Yisrael Yosef B'ni Chai, Siman 3, and Perach Mateh Ahron, Hil. Avodas Kochavim 9:16.
Other
Rashba, Shabbos 4a s.v. ha diamran (near end) says that for a half-slave, half-free (where one partner in the slave freed his portion of the slave) there is no law of leolam bahem taavodu because of the free part of him.
This Rashba has no application to the case of Rabi Eliezer.
Monday, March 16, 2009
Freeing Your Slave - Part 3
Beis Yosef, Orach Chaim Siman 306:
The Rashba was asked: someone sent him a question on Shabbos, his daughter was forcibly removed from his house by a yisrael mumar to remove her from klal yisrael, if he can forcibly chase them on Shabbos lest the mumar scares her into denying her faith, may he travel even outside the techum shabbos or do other melacha, for this doubt (whether he will be successful in bringing her back) may he be mechalel shabbos like we may be in a case of safek nefashos? Rashba answered the matter must be studied, but he leaned towards saying that one may not be mechalel shabbos to save someone from sinning, as we see (Shabbos 4a) we do not say sin so your friend will benefit. Even a small sin is not allowed to save your friend from a big sin...
But Tosfos in Shabbos wrote at first like the Rashba but then asked from the mishna, a half-slave, half free man - we force the his master to free him, yet we hold whomever frees his slave violates a positive mitzvah, and Tosfos answers pru u'revu (procreation) is different because it is a great mitzvah. Another answer is only when one acted in a negligent manner and stuck the bread in the over shortly before shabbos do we not let someone violate a mitzvah on his behalf, but here he was not negligent we allow one to do a small aveira to save him from a great aveira... To the answer of "a great mitzvah," to save her from apostacy, and to the answer of negligence, she was not negligent [but rather was forcibly removed], to be mechalel shabbos to save her is allowed and is a mitzvah to do so and if he [the father] does not want to go, we would force him...even to desecrate shabbos with biblical prohibitions to save her is allowed because to save her from apostacy and her living the rest of her life desecrating shabbos, we say to desecrate shabbos now to save her is a small aveira.
This argument was raised a generation ago in regard to desecrating shabbos to save Jews stuck in the Soviet Union. For example, see Rav Shaul Yisraeli, Chavot Binyamin, siman 14. My gut reaction would be that it is not permitted. Why not? By that time (I think this was in the late 1970's & '80's) a majority of the Jews in the USSR had the status of tinok shenishba, a child raised in captivity among non-Jews (see Shabbos 68b and Rambam, Hil. Mamrim 3:3, and Shut Radvaz II 796 hashmata end of Chelek II). As tinokos shishbu, their not being rescued is not as big of an aveirah as saving someone who was shomer torah umitzvos but was removed to be "shmad-ed," so we wouldn't say this is a case of being mechalel shabbos to save future shabbasos. It was very important to rescue the Jews from the USSR, but from these shitos it would not override Shabbos.
That is how the Beis Yosef applies this halacha of freeing your slave to the question posed to the Rashba.
The Rashba was asked: someone sent him a question on Shabbos, his daughter was forcibly removed from his house by a yisrael mumar to remove her from klal yisrael, if he can forcibly chase them on Shabbos lest the mumar scares her into denying her faith, may he travel even outside the techum shabbos or do other melacha, for this doubt (whether he will be successful in bringing her back) may he be mechalel shabbos like we may be in a case of safek nefashos? Rashba answered the matter must be studied, but he leaned towards saying that one may not be mechalel shabbos to save someone from sinning, as we see (Shabbos 4a) we do not say sin so your friend will benefit. Even a small sin is not allowed to save your friend from a big sin...
But Tosfos in Shabbos wrote at first like the Rashba but then asked from the mishna, a half-slave, half free man - we force the his master to free him, yet we hold whomever frees his slave violates a positive mitzvah, and Tosfos answers pru u'revu (procreation) is different because it is a great mitzvah. Another answer is only when one acted in a negligent manner and stuck the bread in the over shortly before shabbos do we not let someone violate a mitzvah on his behalf, but here he was not negligent we allow one to do a small aveira to save him from a great aveira... To the answer of "a great mitzvah," to save her from apostacy, and to the answer of negligence, she was not negligent [but rather was forcibly removed], to be mechalel shabbos to save her is allowed and is a mitzvah to do so and if he [the father] does not want to go, we would force him...even to desecrate shabbos with biblical prohibitions to save her is allowed because to save her from apostacy and her living the rest of her life desecrating shabbos, we say to desecrate shabbos now to save her is a small aveira.
This argument was raised a generation ago in regard to desecrating shabbos to save Jews stuck in the Soviet Union. For example, see Rav Shaul Yisraeli, Chavot Binyamin, siman 14. My gut reaction would be that it is not permitted. Why not? By that time (I think this was in the late 1970's & '80's) a majority of the Jews in the USSR had the status of tinok shenishba, a child raised in captivity among non-Jews (see Shabbos 68b and Rambam, Hil. Mamrim 3:3, and Shut Radvaz II 796 hashmata end of Chelek II). As tinokos shishbu, their not being rescued is not as big of an aveirah as saving someone who was shomer torah umitzvos but was removed to be "shmad-ed," so we wouldn't say this is a case of being mechalel shabbos to save future shabbasos. It was very important to rescue the Jews from the USSR, but from these shitos it would not override Shabbos.
That is how the Beis Yosef applies this halacha of freeing your slave to the question posed to the Rashba.
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